Plaintiff, a jockey, was seriously injured in a race when another jockey, Daring, cut too sharply in front of her without adequate clearance. The two horses collided, causing Plaintiff to fall to the ground, sustaining injury. The State Racetrack Commission ruled that, by cutting in too sharply, Daring committed a foul in violation of racetrack rules requiring adequate clearance for crossing lanes. Plaintiff has brought an action against Daring for damages in which one count is based on battery.
Will Plaintiff prevail on the battery claim?
A. Yes, if Daring was reckless in cutting across in front of Plaintiff’s horse.
B. Yes, because the State Racetrack Commission determined that Daring committed a foul in violation of rules applicable to racing.
C. No, unless Daring intended to cause impermissible contact between the two horses or apprehension of such contact by Plaintiff.
D. No, because Plaintiff assumed the risk of accidental injury inherent in riding as a jockey in a horse race.
{ 13 comments… read them below or add one }
Answer C is correct. The mental element required for the tort of battery is intent to bring about a touching which is harmful, or intent to cause apprehension of a touching if the touching subsequently occurs. Reckless or even willful wanton conduct does not supply the mental intent for battery.
Answer A is incorrect. Reckless conduct does not supply the necessary intent to sustain the intentional tort of battery.
Answer B is incorrect. Battery is an intentional tort. The determination that a foul was committed does not establish the necessary intent.
Answer D is incorrect. While the plaintiff assumes risks inherent in riding in a horse race, she does not assume the risk that another rider intended to harm her. If Daring intended to harm Plaintiff, she would have a valid action in battery even though plaintiff and Daring were engaged in a horse race. There is no implied consent in the horse-racing context to intentional touchings.
D. inherently dangerous activity, Assumption of the Risk. Plaintiff knows the risk, understands the risk and voluntary takes the risk will bar recovery.
I still belief the question is on the scope of an implied consent in a sporting activity. I am not sure if the commissioner’s ruling (foul) per se should be regarded as a prima facie element of intent. Daring’s conduct will be measured against that of a reasonable person engaging in horse ride. So if such contact is inherent in the sport, despite committing a foul, he can only be liable if his conduct was intentional and exceeds the consent implied by the plaintiff.
Answer C: because under Tort common law the contact for battery is “harmful or offensive”. The offensiveness is measured against a reasonable person standard. Harmful is measured against intention to do an act that ultimately results in “unpermitted” or as described here “impermissible” contact. Here, the intent of battery can be shown becasue the track racing rules required adequate clearance for crossing lanes, and the Racetrack Commission ruled that by cutting in too sharply, Daring caused the injury. The commissions ruling pretty much locks up the reasonable person standard, and Darings act would be considered offensive.
Battery…to the Nth degree.
C
The best answer is C b/c it includes both definitions of a battery.
C is best. Assumption of risk is not a defense to intentional torts. However, it is a defense to wanton or reckless conduct (that knocks out A). D states Plaintiff assumed the risk of “accidental” injury inherent in riding as a jockey in a horse race. D would be okay if Plaintiff’s actions were accidental and based on negligence theory. However, here we are dealing with the intentional tort of battery. C clearly tackles the issue of intent.
C; For the “unless” factor
C for me also
The fact that the Commission ruled Daring broke the a safety rule suggests Daring’s action exceeded any implicit consent by the other jockey’s
C for me.
D: I think there’s risk of accidential collision involved in horse race, the issue in my opinion is if Daring exceeded the scope of the implied consent. Though ruled a foul, I am not sure it was excessive.
C is the best answer. The Plaintiff did not not assume the risk of this type of injury by participating in the race. C is a better answer because it’s use of the limitation of “unless”…
answer C….i almost went with D but the P did not have implied consent to this type of contact.